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Executive Summary
Introduction and Background
While contracting out has been the predominant method of privatization, there has been
greater emphasis in recent times on using public-private partnerships (sometimes referred
to as PPPs or P3s) instead. These public-private partnerships differ from contracting out,
as they are characterized more by “a commitment between public and private actors … in
which partners develop products together and share risks, costs, and revenues” (Klijn &
Teisman 2000, p. 85).
In the transportation arena the focus on public-private partnerships has resulted from both
the need for greater reliance on private capital to fund critical infrastructure and services
and the need to tap private sector expertise to ensure delivery of high quality
infrastructure and services on time and on budget. Public-private partnerships have been
increasingly used to expand private sector involvement in the provision and delivery of
transportation projects. Privately-operated, and sometimes privately-built and privatelyowned, airport and rail terminals, tollroads, and bridges or tunnels have become more and
more common.
This report serves as a primer on public-private partnerships for the delivery of
transportation infrastructure and services. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the concept
of PPPs, providing a broad definition of the concepts, comparing it to contracting out,
and discussing a theoretical framework for understanding why, when and how publicprivate partnerships are appropriate as a privatization strategy. Chapter 3 reviews six
public-private partnership models – design bid build, private contract fee services, design
build, design build operate maintain or build operate transfer, design build finance
operate, and build own operate – identified by the Federal Highway Administration as
available for use by transportation agencies considering privatizing transportation
projects. Adopting a public-private partnership involves two important decisions which
are addressed in Chapter 4. These decisions are: (1) the decision to privatize via a publicprivate partnership; and (2) the decision on which partnership model to adopt. Chapter 5
concludes by discussing key issues and factors necessary for successful transportation
public-private partnerships. This report also provides a glossary of terms (Appendix A) as
a reference for understanding the terminology and language of privatization and publicprivate partnerships.

Understanding Public-Private Partnerships
In this report, public-private partnerships are defined as collaborations involving actors
and/or funding from business, nonprofit, and government organizations, where costs,
risks, resources and skills are shared in jointly-developed projects that mutually benefit
the partners and the community being served. Public-private partnerships are more
3

encompassing than contracting out. While contracting out can be thought of as a subset or
subcategory of public-private partnerships, it represents one extreme of public-private
partnership options, in which private sector involvement is more limited and the
government agency has greater decision-making authority. The next table summarizes the
key differences between public-private partnerships and contracting out.
Key Differences between Public-Private Partnerships and Contracting Out
Characteristics
Decisionmaking and
production/
delivery
responsibility

Public-Private Partnership Options with
Greater Private Sector Participation
□ Government and private agencies are
involved in joint decision-making and
joint production and delivery.

Contracting Out
□

□

Primary benefits

□

Management
structure

□

Public-private
interactions

□

Benefits of partnership arrangements
principally
involve
increasing
effectiveness (synergy, expertise and
enrichment of output).
Based on the principles of process
management because of joint goals,
decision-making,
financing,
and
production.
Mutual trust is crucial for a lasting
relationship between partners that
maintain their own interests, work
styles, accountability and financing
principles.

□

□

□

Government agency defines the
problem, decides on level of service
or production, specifies the solution
and selects a private company to
produce results.
Private sector decides on how to
produce results in most efficient
manner given constraints imposed
by the government agency.
Benefits of contractual agreements
principally involve quicker and
cheaper production or delivery of
output.
Based on the principles of project
management because there are clear
goals and well-defined project
specifications.
Contractual transparency regarding
the rules of tendering, selection and
delivery, and rules of inspection
and monitoring is crucial for a good
working relationship.

There are two fundamental issues inherent in privatization and public-private
partnerships. The first is the problem of adverse selection or selecting the wrong private
partner. The second is the problem of moral hazard, which, because of the government’s
inability to observe at all times the behavior of the private partner, poses the possibility of
the private partner shirking its responsibilities. Both problems are related to three
important aspects of public-private partnerships: (1) project specificity; (2) desired
accountability; and (3) private partner selection. Four components of the project – input,
output, outcome, and payment – dictate the extent to which the project can be specified
and the appropriateness of privatization and public-private partnership approaches.
Accountability, in turn, is a function of project specificity. As the degree of specificity
increases, the government agency can hold its private partner to greater accountability
standards. Unlike contracting out, some partnership projects require that partner selection
be based on negotiation, with the partnership arising more as a negotiated contract than
from competitive bidding or tendering.
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Public-Private Partnership Models
The Federal Highway Administration defines seven partnership models that can be
organized along a spectrum from greater public responsibility to greater private
responsibility. These models, ranging from greater public responsibility to greater private
responsibility, are: (1) design bid build; (2) private contract fee services; (3) design build;
(4) build operate transfer; (5) design build operate maintain; (6) design build finance
operate; and (7) build own operate. The important characteristics of these partnership
models are summarized in the next three tables.
Private Partner Responsibilities
Private Partner Responsibilities
Partnership Model
Design
Construction
Operations
Maintenance
Design Bid Build
X
X
Private Contract Fee Services
X
X
Design Build
X
X
Build Operate Transfer or
Design Build Operate Maintain
X
X
X
X
Design Build Finance Operate
X
X
X
X
Build Own Operate
X
X
X
X
Note: In all models, the government agency is responsible for right-of-way and eminent domain issues.

Government Partner Responsibilities
Government Agency Responsibilities
Partnership Model
Operations
Maintenance
Fiscal/ Payment
Monitoring
Design Bid Build
X
X
X
Low
Private Contract Fee Services
X
Low
Design Build
X
X
X
Low
Build Operate Transfer or
Design Build Operate Maintain
X
Medium
Design Build Finance Operate
High
Build Own Operate
Low
Note: In all models, the government agency is responsible for right-of-way and eminent domain issues.

Infrastructure Ownership and Financing Sources
Partnership Model
Design Bid Build
Private Contract Fee Services
Design Build
Build Operate Transfer or Design
Build Operate Maintain

Design Build Finance Operate
Build Own Operate

Infrastructure Ownership
Government
Government
Government
Private ownership for
duration of contract, then
reverts to the government
Private ownership for
duration of contract, then
reverts to the government
Private
5

Financing Source
Government
Government
Government
Primarily government
financing with some private
financing
Primarily private financing
with some government
financing
Private

Public-Private Partnership Decision Factors
This report provides a strategic framework, in the form of a set of questions, for
government agencies to decide if privatization via a public-private partnership is
appropriate. This framework is presented in the next table.
Strategic Framework for the Privatization and Public-Private Partnership Decision
Key Question
1. What are the goals and constraints
of the privatization initiative being
considered?
2. To what extent must the
government agency be involved in
the tasks or activities?
3. Does the government agency have
the capacity to perform the tasks?
4. How measurable are the outputs
and outcomes of the proposed
privatization initiative?
5. How capital intensive are the
project’s activities?

6. What is the impact if the task or
activity is performed poorly?

Impact on Decision to Privatize
□ Privatization is more appropriate if goal is
improved and/or innovative goods and services.
□ Political, social or cultural constraints complicate
but do not preclude privatization.
□ Privatization should be considered if ends matter
to the exclusion of means.
□ If extensive government input is continuously
required, privatization becomes less viable.
□ Having the government capacity to produce some
of the goods or services makes privatization a
viable solution.
□ If objective and measurable output and outcomes
can be easily identified and collected,
privatization should be considered.
□ As the costs and up-front capital needs increases,
privatization becomes less feasible.
□ If the government agency seeks private financing,
privatization via a public-private partnership may
be a good solution.
□ Privatization is easier when the activity or service
approximately covers its costs.
□ If the impact of poor performance is irreversible
or reversible at a high cost, privatization should
not be considered.
□ If there are serious political, social, economic, or
environmental impacts of service failure,
privatization should not be considered.

Once the decision has been made to pursue privatization via a public-private partnership,
the government agency faces the difficult problem of deciding on which public-private
partnership approach to adopt.
The decision on which partnership model to adopt should be made based on several
criteria, including: (1) the source of financing; (2) the complexity of tasks involved; (3)
the degree of project specificity; and (4) the basis for private partner selection. These
decision criteria and the appropriate public-private partnership models given these criteria
are summarized in the next table.
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Public-Private Partnership Model Decision Criteria
Relative Project Specificity
Public-Private Partnership Model
Design Bid Build

G

Design Build

G

Build Own Operate

Task
Complexity

Inputs

High

G

Private Contract Fee Services
Build Operate Transfer or
Design Build Operate
Maintain
Design Build Finance Operate
(a)

Source of
Financing (a)

Outputs
Easily
identified
&
measured

Outcomes
Simple &
quantitative

Private
Partner
Selection
Competitive
Tendering

G/P
P/G

Increasing
Complexity

P

Low

Complex &
qualitative

Negotiated
Contract

G – purely government financing;
P – purely private financing;
G/P – primarily government financing with some private financing;
P/G – primarily private with some public financing.

Key Issues and Critical Success Factors
Public-private partnership initiatives involve a range of skills, experiences, and resources
to deliver the required infrastructure or service. Successful partnerships require a shift in
the roles of the government agency. Rather than being the independent and only provider
of the public goods and services, government agencies become partners who must be
smart and prudent in their dealings with the private partner that ultimately provides the
goods and services. Government agencies must adopt what Fossett et al. (2000) refer to
as “prudent purchasing” or what Kettl (1993) calls “smart buying.”
This report discusses key issues and critical success factors for effective and successful
privatization through public-private partnerships. These can be organized into three
categories: (1) process factors, which must be addressed and considered before
structuring a partnership; (2) partner factors, which are the relevant factors for selecting
the right partner(s) and developing a relationship with these partner(s); and (3) structural
factors which are related to how the partnership is structured, put together, and managed.
The next table summarizes the three categories.
Three Categories of Success Factors
Process Factors
□ Provide economic rationale
for private sector
involvement.
□ Create institutional support
and infrastructure for
collaborative efforts.

Partner Factors
□ Carefully design and
consistently implement the
partner selection process.
□ Develop the necessary
relationships to pursue the
agreed-on common goal.
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Structural Factors
□ Clearly delineate roles and
responsibilities
□ Adopt performance-based
contracting.
□ Enforce effective contract
accountability.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Background

1.1 Introduction
Privatization via public-private partnerships (sometimes referred to as PPPs or P3s) has
increasingly become a policy option for government agencies struggling to provide
public goods and services to expanding service populations with dwindling resources.
Public-private partnerships are seen more and more as viable solutions to this problem of
increasing service needs in the face of what Osborne and Hutchinson (2004) term a
“permanent fiscal crisis.” In the transportation arena, the popularity of public-private
partnerships can be attributed to many factors, including innovation and new technology,
the need for private sector expertise, and the potential for private funding.
In this study, public-private partnerships are defined as collaborations involving actors
and/or funding from business, non-profit and government organizations where the costs,
risks, resources and skills are shared in jointly-developed projects that mutually benefit
the partners and the community being served. However, the collaborative nature of the
partnerships, coupled with joint decision-making and joint production, make them appear
complex and confusing. Many government agencies that have been considering publicprivate partnerships may have turned away from using partnerships for reasons such as
lack of understanding of public-private partnerships, confusion over the many partnership
options available, and inability to make the distinction between public-private
partnerships and other privatization methods.
This study is intended to provide an overview of public-private partnerships as a tool for
delivering transportation infrastructure and services. This report summarizes the findings
of this study, providing a primer on public-private partnerships and how they can be
effectively and successfully utilized. There are many issues, at several levels, that are
addressed in this discussion of public-private partnerships. Broad conceptual issues
particularly relate to the distinction between public and private goods. Specifically, which
goods should be provided by the public sector, by the private sector, and under what
circumstances can the delivery of public goods be undertaken by the private sector? In
contrast, narrower policy issues pertain to the reasons behind privatization or the goals of
privatization and the subsequent decision to adopt public-private partnerships as a policy
solution. At the micro level, project-specific issues involve factors and elements critical
for the successful implementation and execution of public-private partnerships.
This introductory chapter addresses the broad conceptual issues associated with
privatization and public-private partnerships. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical discussion
of public-private partnerships as a tool for achieving privatization policy goals and
Chapter 3 reviews partnership options available given these policy goals. Chapters 4 and
5 examine the micro issues, analyzing the privatization and public-private partnership
decisions and identifying critical factors for successful partnerships.
8

1.2 Public and Private Goods and Services
Goods and services can be defined along a spectrum or continuum, with three broad
categories: (1) private, (2) public, and (3) publicly-provided (see Figure 1.1). At one end
of the spectrum are pure private goods that are excludable and rivalrous in consumption.
Because of these two characteristics, the private market does a good job of adjusting the
supply to the demand, and there is virtually no rationale for public intervention. At the
other end are pure public goods and services, the use of which is strongly nonexcludable
and nonrivalrous. The supply or provision of such goods and services are typically
through collective nonmarket action. Although it is possible to conceive of ways in which
the private sector may provide pure public goods and services (Coase 1960), the
transaction costs of creating sufficient excludability to ensure the feasibility of private
supply and the absence of free ridership are higher than the costs of direct public
provision for all users (Sclar 2000). Somewhere in the center of the spectrum are
publicly-provided goods and services. These publicly-provided goods and services are
often sufficiently excludable and rivalrous that they can be provided, to some degree, by
both public and private means. However, these types of goods and services often generate
externalities, either in the form of external costs or benefits not directly quantifiable for
the single user. Public intervention is often warranted in the case of externalitygenerating goods and services as these externalities occur outside the marketplace and do
not play a role in private market calculations. Public subsidies, for example, can ensure
that the more beneficial goods and services (those generating external benefit) are
sufficiently produced and those generating external costs produced less frequently or not
at all. In this report, the term “public goods and services” will refer both to purely public
and publicly-provided goods and services. However, a publicly-provided good does not
necessarily have to be directly provided by the public sector. In fact, when a good or
service falls in this middle category, the issue of how it is provided is not a simple matter.
It is for this reason that publicly-provided goods are more often the principal focus of
privatization efforts than are purely public goods.
Figure 1.1. Continuum of Goods and Services
Pure Private
(privately provided)

Publicly-Provided
(privately or publicly provided)

Pure Public
(publicly provided)

1.3 Privatizing the Delivery of Public Goods and Services
Over the past two decades there has been a worldwide movement away from government
provision to government procurement of public goods and service. Economic theory
suggests that clear profit motives drive the private sector to be more efficient in the
provision of goods and services, compared to the public sector. However, the private
sector, because of this profit maximizing constraint, may underproduce or underprovide
public goods and services. In the case of the privatization of public goods and services
9

delivery, the challenge for government agencies is to define the optimal level of good or
service provision – which many times is not the market-driven level – and given this
production level determine the extent to which the private sector can provide the goods
and services with greater efficiency or effectiveness than the public sector. The primary
question that must be addressed by policymakers and public managers are: (1) how much
public goods and services to provide? and (2) how to provide these public goods and
services?
The decision regarding the optimal level of public goods and services often results from
negotiations between elected officials, public administrators and, sometimes, the private
sector. Within the transportation arena, this determination occurs in different ways. Air
travel, for example, while part of a government-regulated industry, is determined by the
privately-owned airlines who define their own service capacity. Optimal levels of road
and highway infrastructure, in contrast, is determined by the federal and state
departments of transportation without much input from the private sector. Both public
and private entities are involved in determining optimal rail capacity and utilization. For
the purpose of this report, it is sufficient to note that defining how much public goods and
services to provide is, in itself, a complex process, but one that is beyond the scope of this
study.
There are three streams of literature that explain the movement by government agencies
toward privatizing the delivery of public goods and services. The public choice literature
argues that the production by the private sector tends to be more efficient than production
by the government sector. The absence of the competitive marketplace and the
subsequent lack of a profit motive and bottom line cause government bureaucracy to be
less efficient than the private sector. This “inefficiency is an inherent characteristic of
municipal bureaucracies because of the incentive structures that encourage empire
building and overproduction” (Greene 1996, p. 633). The stream of literature on the “the
competition prescription” (Kettle 1993; Osborne & Gaebler 1992), on the other hand,
suggests that competition – for market share, functions, or resources – inspires efficiency.
The monopolistic habits of government agencies, therefore, introduce organizational
waste and subsequently results in inefficient production and delivery of goods and
services. Donahue (1989, p. 78), for example, argues that “[p]ublic versus private
matters, but competitive versus noncompetitive usually matters more.” For both the
public choice and competition literature, private delivery of public goods and services,
therefore, can result in more efficient provision of such goods and services.
Cohen (2001) argues for “functional matching,” which assumes that in “the absence of
monopoly, certain functions are most efficiently and effectively performed by the private
sector, others by the nonprofit sector, and others by government… where accountability
is a critical value in the execution of a program, that program tends to be best
implemented directly by government” (p. 434). This approach describes privatization of
public goods and services delivery as being more appropriate – from efficiency and
effectiveness perspectives – under certain circumstances than the public delivery of these
goods and services by government agencies.
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Research by the Council of State Governments show that privatization has become
widespread among state agencies in the U.S. A survey of state departments of
transportation (DOTs), for example, found that close to two-thirds of participating DOTs
privatized 15% or more of their work; other government agencies reported similar use of
privatization (Chi et al. 2004).
Figure 1.2. The Extent of Privatization in State Departments of Transportation
% of work
privatized
61%

> 15%

11% to 15%

6%
15%

6% to 10%

1% to 5%

12%
6%

< 1%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Source: Created by Research Team from data in Chi et al. (2004), Table C p. 480.

Contracting out has been the predominant approach to the privatization of public goods
and services in the U.S. Brudney et al. (2005) report that more than 70% of state
agencies engage in contracting out. More than 30% contract for work equivalent to less
than 5% of their budget; 55% contract for 10% or less of their budget; and 17% contract
for 40% or more of their budget.
Why have government agencies pursued privatization? The chief motivation for
contracting out has been the desire by state and local officials to enhance the efficiency of
the delivery of traditionally publicly-provided goods and services (Greene 2002).
Privatization was seen as an option to increase efficiency by reducing the cost of
delivering public goods and services and improving the quality of delivery and provision
of these goods and services. For example, a 1995 survey of privatization of municipal
services in 100 of the largest U.S. cities found that reducing costs and improving services
were the two most important factors in the decision to privatize (Dilger et al. 1997).

Cost Savings
Dilger et al. (1997) found that estimated cost savings from privatization range from a low
of 16% for municipal support functions to a high of 21% for public works and
11

transportation. Consistent levels of cost savings were found by a Council of State
Governments survey (Chi & Jasper 1998) which reported that:
More than 60% of responding agencies reported cost savings between 6% and 10%;
4% or respondents reported savings in the 11% to 15% range; and
15% reported cost savings greater than 15%.
Hodge (2000) estimated the average cost savings from outsourcing to be between 6% and
12%. A more recent study (Brudney et al. 2005) found that close to 35% of agencies
reported that contracting out had decreased the costs of delivering services; 29% reported
that contracting had resulted in higher costs and 30% found that it had had no effect on
costs. Rehfuss (1989) found that experiences with privatization resulted in actual cost
differences (between contracting out and direct public provision) that have typically
measured in single-digit percentages.
For transportation infrastructure and services, the Council of State Governments survey
found average cost savings to be in-line with the findings by Rehfuss (1989). Cost
savings of less than 1% were the most common (see Figure 1.3). Cost savings in excess
of 10% were less likely, being reported by less than 5% of responding state DOTs.
Figure 1.3. Cost Savings from Privatization of Transportation Infrastructure and Services
Cost Reduction or
Cost Saving
No Response

5%

Unknown

37%

More than 15%

2%

11% to 15%

2%
5%

6% to 10%

10%

1% to 5%

39%

Less than 1%
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Source: Chi et al. (2004), Figure M on p. 471.

Enhanced Delivery
In terms of improvements to service delivery, the study by Dilger et al. (1997) found that
the average city or municipality observed improved service delivery that ranged from
24% (for public works and transportation) to 28% (for public safety). Contracting out
experiences in social services, however, showed that cost savings came at the expense of
reduced service levels, either in terms of a smaller customer base (Kamerman & Kahn
12

1989) or lower quality service (Bendick 1989). Brudney et al.’s 2005 study found that
almost half of the state agencies that utilized contracting out found it improved service
quality. In contrast, slightly under 10% reported that it resulted in decreased service
quality and 35% felt that contracting had no effect on quality.

1.4 Public-Private Partnerships as a Privatization Approach
Privatization of government services has been organized in various ways, ranging from
contracting out production and delivery to the private sector (but with public agencies
retaining responsibility for the final product or service), to partnerships between private
and public organizations for the joint production and delivery of government goods and
services, to the creation of new public or private sector organizations.
While contracting out is the predominant method for privatization, there has been greater
emphasis in recent times on using public-private partnerships (see Figure 1.4). As Kettl
(1993) notes, “[e]very major policy initiative launched by the federal government since
World War II – including Medicare and Medicaid, environmental cleanup and
restoration, antipoverty programs and job training, interstate highways and sewage
treatment plants – has been managed through public-private partnerships” (p. 4). This is
especially true in transportation, where the focus on public-private partnerships has
resulted from both the need for greater reliance on private capital to fund critical
infrastructure and the need to tap private sector expertise to ensure delivery of high
quality infrastructure and services on time and on budget.
Various forms of public-private partnerships have been used throughout American
history. The Transcontinental Railroad, built in the 1860s, is a classic example of publicprivate partnership use for transportation in the U.S. (Norment 2002). The federal
government owned the land that was then included as part of the assets upon which
private company stocks were issued for the funding of the railroad. The government also
deeded the adjoining parcels of land to the private developers involved in building the
railroad, who then developed the land for farmland and towns, to create a customer base
for the railroad. The land, which was previously an underutilized government asset,
became the critical component in the private sector’s ability to finance a major
transportation infrastructure project.
In recent years, transportation projects have increasingly become an area of focus for the
use of public-private partnerships, with the goal of expanding private sector involvement
in the delivery of transportation projects. Privately-operated (and sometimes privatelybuilt and privately-owned) airport and rail terminals, tollroads, bridges or tunnels have
become increasingly common.
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Figure 1.4. Methods Used to Privatize State Programs and Services
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Source: Chi et al. (2004), Figure F on p. 468.

1.5 Project Overview
Privatization is often viewed as a tool that can be usefully employed by government
agencies in certain environments to enhance the delivery and provision of public goods
and services. However, government agencies need to exercise good judgment and caution
in both making the decision to privatize, and choosing the methods for privatization,
being careful not “to select a hammer when they really need a wrench” (Gormley 1994,
p. 231).
Many government agencies have adopted contracting out as their method for
privatization. However, for many situations, contracting out may not be the appropriate
privatization solution. For many government needs, public-private partnership may prove
to be a more appropriate approach for privatizing public goods and services, especially
for the delivery or provision of transportation infrastructure and services.
However, public-private partnerships as tools for privatization are not very well
understood. This report, therefore, seeks to provide a primer on public-private
partnerships for the delivery of transportation infrastructure and services. The report
provides an overview of public-private partnership (Chapter 2), providing a broad
definition of the concept, comparing public-private partnerships to contracting out, and
discussing a theoretical framework for understanding why, when, and how they are
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appropriate as a privatization strategy. Chapter 3 reviews seven public-private partnership
models available for use by government agencies to privatize transportation projects.
Figure 1.5 summarizes the likely steps involved in launching a public-private partnership.
This process involves two important decision points which will be discussed in this
report. Chapter 4 addresses both the decision to privatize delivery of a transportation
project and the decision on which partnership model to adopt to implement the project.
Figure 1.5. Public-Private Partnership Process and Critical Decision Points
1 Vision

- Identify appropriate project
- Determine vision for project

2 Decide to Privatize
3 Project Definition
- Define input, process, output, outcomes
- Define investment and funding requirements
- Define roles and responsibilities
- Identify project timeline
f Decide on the Partnership Model to Adopt
g Feasibility Analysis
- Document costs, benefits, and risks for the governmentdelivery approach
- Address legal and legislative hurdles
- Qualitative and quantitative evaluation
- Demonstrate affordability, risk and value for private sector
h Partner Selection
- Select private sector partner based on specified criteria
i Contract Formalization
- Performance-based or output-driven contract?
- Negotiate contract terms
- Clarify roles and responsibilities, desired output and outcomes,
payment and financing mechanisms
j Commence Project
- Transfer responsibilities to private party
- Establish project management, monitoring and control structure
- Implement systems, processes, and payment mechanisms
- Determine conflict resolution tools
- Define exit strategy
Source: Adapted from KPMG (2002) public-private partnership process for e-government projects.
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A major concern for government agencies as they contemplate privatization and publicprivate partnerships is how they can operate as “smart buyers” (Kettl 1993) or “prudent
purchasers” (Fossett et al. 2000), rather than “direct producers.” This is an especially
important issue for agencies, such as transportation agencies, where the public goods and
services being provided are tangible and highly visible. Chapter 5 of this report
addresses this concern by discussing key issues and factors for successful transportationrelated public-private partnerships. The report also provides a glossary of terms
(Appendix A) to serve as a reference for better understanding the terminology and
language of privatization and public-private partnerships.
The specific research questions addressed in this report are:
(1) When is privatization via public-private partnerships an appropriate solution for
providing critical transportation infrastructure and services?
(2) What public-private partnership models are suitable given the specific features of
the transportation project, such as the need for private financing, the degree of
project complexity and specificity, and public accountability?
(3) What are critical success factors for public-private partnerships?
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Chapter 2: Understanding PPP

2.1 Defining the Public-Private Partnership
A public-private partnerships can be broadly characterized as “a commitment between
public and private actors of some durability, in which partners develop products together
and share risks, costs, and revenues which are associated with these products” (Klijn &
Teisman 2000, p. 85). McQuaid (2000) provides several definitions of public-private
partnerships, each emphasizing different dimensions of the concept. For example, he cites
Holland (1984) as defining a public-private partnership as cooperation between
individuals or organizations in the public or private sectors for mutual benefit. Harding
(1990) approaches public-private partnerships as “any action which relies on the
agreement of actors in the public and private sectors and which also contributes in some
way to improving the urban economic and the quality of life” (p. 110). In contrast,
Sellgren (1990) views the public-private partnership as a scheme with involvement or
funding from more than one agency in either the public or private sectors. The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts approached public-private partnerships as
collaborations among business firms, non-profit organizations, and government agencies,
in which risks, resources and skills are shared in projects that benefit each partner as well
as the community.
The consulting firm KPMG (2002) defines public-private partnerships as a form of
government procurement involving the use of private sector capital to wholly or partly
fund an asset, which is then used to deliver government outcomes. In essence, the publicprivate partnership is simply an agreement between the government and a private
company (or private companies), to share in the risk and rewards of an initiative
involving public services. The FHWA uses the term to refer to contractual agreements
formed between a public agency and private sector entity that allow for greater private
sector participation in the delivery of transportation projects.
The definitions and perspectives previously discussed highlight the many dimensions of
public-private partnerships, including cooperation, mutual benefits, involvement or
funding from multiple agencies, collaboration, and shared risks, resources and skills.
From these, we arrive at a multidimensional understanding of public-private
partnerships as collaborations involving actors and/or funding from business, nonprofit, and government organizations, where costs, risks, resources and skills are
shared in jointly-developed projects that mutually benefit the partners and the
community being served.
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2.2 Public-Private Partnerships and Contracting Out
Section 1.3 illustrated how previous experiences with privatization have often not
achieved the efficiency goals associated with privatization. This failure can be partly
attributed to the extensive use of contracting out as a privatization approach. With
contracting out, the public agency unilaterally defines the project, limiting the scope for
delivery of the project’s goods or services. The public agency acts as a commissioning
party, defining the characteristics of the project, then contracting it out to a private or
nonprofit organization on the basis of a clear cut and straightforward program of
requirements. The product is a principal-agent relationship in which the public agency
defines the problem and provides the specification of the solution. The result is an
arrangement that is hardly suitable for mobilizing the market expertise, innovativeness
and creativity of the private sector (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2002).
Public-private partnerships are more encompassing than contracting out (see Figure 2.1).
The public-private partnership transforms the government’s role from that of public
financier to that of buyer, while at the same time being an equal partner in the production
and/or delivery of the public goods and services. This partnership arrangement is based
on joint decision-making and subsequent joint production or delivery by both partner
groups.
Figure 2.1. Contracting Out as a Subset of Public-Private Partnership
public-private
partnership

contracting
out

Source: Developed by the research team.

While contracting out can be thought of as a subset or subcategory of public-private
partnerships, it represents one extreme of partnership options, in which private sector
involvement is more limited and the government agency has greater authority in making
critical decisions regarding the project. Private sector funding is almost non-existent in
contracting out; the private sector receives payment from the public sector for the
services it provides during the life of the project. The different characteristics of
contracting out versus other public-private partnership options with greater private sector
participation (in terms of funding, decision-making, and production/delivery) are critical
for the understanding of why partnerships are more viable options for privatization of
public goods and services. Table 2.1 summarizes the key differences between publicprivate partnership and contracting out options for privatization.
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Table 2.1. Key Differences between Public-Private Partnership and Contracting Out
Characteristics
Public-Private Partnership Options with Greater
Contracting Out
Private Sector Participation
Decision-making
□ Government and private agencies are involved in □ Government agency defines the problem, decides on
and production
joint decision-making and joint production.
level of service or production, specifies the solution
responsibility
and selects a private company to produce results.
□ Private sector decides on how to produce results in
most efficient manner given constraints imposed by
the government agency.
Primary benefits
□ Benefits of partnership arrangements principally □ Benefits of contractual agreements principally involve
involve increasing effectiveness (synergy,
efficiency (quicker and cheaper production or delivery
expertise and enrichment of output).
of output).
Management
□ Based on the principles of process management
□ Based on the principles of project management
structure
because of joint goals, decision-making,
because there are clear goals and well-defined project
financing, and production.
specifications.
Public-private
□ Mutual trust is crucial for a lasting relationship
□ Contractual transparency regarding the rules of
interactions
between partners that maintain their own
tendering, selection and delivery, and rules of
interests, work styles, accountability and
inspection and monitoring is crucial for a good
financing principles.
working relationship.
Keys to success
□ Interweaving of goals, defining roles, establishing □ Unambiguous definitions of goals, rules of selection
rules for ongoing interactions, and developing
and rules of delivery.
rules and tailor-made assignments for joint effort
and production commitments.
Important issues
□ How to balance accountability, autonomy,
□ How to be a “prudent” or “value” purchaser of
legitimacy, etc. to ensure that public-private
privately-produced and delivered public goods and
partnerships tap the efficiency potential of the
services?
private sector while providing the non-market
determined “optimal” production level for jointlyproduced and delivered public goods and
services?
Source: Developed by the research team from information in Klijn and Teisman (2000) and other sources.
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2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Public-Private Partnerships
One of the primary motivations for favoring the use of public-private partnerships has
been to limit the government’s financial deficit by involving private investment in the
delivery of public infrastructure and services (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2002). With the
use of partnerships also comes the expectation that projects delivered through the
partnership are qualitatively better than projects developed by private or public parties
alone – the product resulting from the whole (through a partnership) is greater than the
sum of the individual pieces (independently produced by each party). Private sector
participation is desirable because private organizations may operate more efficiently,
possessing the market experience and innovative creativity that public organizations often
lack. On the other hand, public sector participation is essential given the long-term
uncertainties, political risks, and public accountability involved with the project.
The often-cited benefits of public-private partnerships are generally that they provide the
government agency with access to private sector design and innovation, project
management skills, and private sector financing. Public-private partnerships are often
used to access resources that may not be available in or to the public sector, thereby
speeding up development and enhancing quality. If the partnership is appropriately
structured, private sector resources and expertise will enhance the government agency’s
ability to deliver new assets and infrastructure on time and on budget. This allows
government agencies to economize their resources while continuing to provide the
necessary level of public goods and services. Table 2.2 summarizes the advantages and
disadvantages of privatization using public-private partnerships.
Table 2.2. Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages of Public-Private Partnerships
Advantages
Disadvantages
□ Incorporates private sector resources
□ May require enabling legislation before
and expertise, allowing for the on-time
partnerships can be established.
and on-budget delivery of high quality □ Loss of direct government control and
transportation infrastructure and
accountability for the provision and
services.
delivery of public goods and services.
□ Ensures that higher risk and higher
□ Requires new institutional structures
payoff projects are properly
for partnership management and
considered in the planning and
monitoring.
budgeting process.
□ Increased vulnerability of public goods
□ Provides an infusion of private capital.
and services delivery to the whims of
□ Establishes a culture of cooperation
the private sector.
between public and private sector.
□ Requires significant effort to build trust
and relationships.
Source: Developed by the research team.
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2.4 Theoretical Framework for Understanding Public-Private Partnerships
Fundamentally, public-private partnerships represent an approach to problem solving
where resources or capacities of different organizations are pooled for common purposes.
Characteristics of a typical public-private partnership are summarized in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3. Characteristics of a Typical Public-Private Partnership
□

Private sector partner typically invests in a capital asset and is responsible for maintaining
and operating it over the life of the contract.
□ The focus of the partnership is on the services provided (ends) and not on the assets used to
provide the services (means).
□ Risk transfer is a key element of the partnership.
□ Government assets are often transferred or made available to the private partner.
□ The contractual arrangement specifies that the private partner will take responsibility for
and assume the risks for all or part of the public sector function.
□ Value for money, which is critically dependent on the way risks are allocated between the
parties, must be demonstrated to justify private sector involvement.
Source: KPMG (2002).

From a government agency’s perspective, there are two fundamental problems inherent in
privatization and public-private partnerships. The first is the problem of adverse
selection, which results from selecting the wrong private sector partner. For example, the
government agency may inadvertently select a private partner that is unable to produce
the desired output or outcome. The second problem – the moral hazard problem – results
from the government agency’s inability to observe at all times the behavior of the private
partner. It is possible that even the most capable organization will shirk its
responsibilities and divert resources to other tasks or simply to profit (Donahue 1989).
Addressing both problems requires emphasis on three important aspects: (1) project
specificity; (2) desired accountability; and (3) private partner selection. These three
aspects will be discussed next.

Project Specificity
The degree of project specificity relates to how well the project can be defined or
specified. There are four important components of specificity which dictate the extent to
which privatization can be undertaken and the partnership approach appropriate for the
privatization effort. These are:
□ Input – the material and labor needed to produce the output and the process to
transform the input into output.
□ Output – the project deliverables that each partner would be responsible for
producing.
□ Outcome – the goals of the project that will be achieved through the delivery of
outputs.
□ Payment – the financing mechanisms through which the project will be funded and/or
the private partner compensated.
21

Accountability
“The main difference between the hollow state and direct government provision of services lies
in the presence of a bureaucratic mechanism. The hollow state has very few command and
control mechanisms; public managers find themselves involved in arranging networks that may
enable them to gain the advantages of scope and scale without the negatives associated with
bureaucracy (i.e., redundancy and rising costs)” (Milward & Provan 2000, p. 363).

The privatization of the provision and delivery of public goods and services, and the
resulting delegation of authority to nongovernmental agents, can lead to the potential loss
of legitimacy since the formerly government function is now accomplished at arms
length. However, an important element of providing public goods and services is that
“[p]olitical principals can transfer power to their agents, within limits set by law, but they
cannot transfer legitimacy in the same way” (Majone 1997, p. 13). In fact, privatization
only changes the venue within which production and delivery of public goods and
services occur, but does not impact the government agency’s responsibility to the public.
As Kuttner (1989) argues, “[i]f government pays the freight, government necessarily has
to police the contractor. Yet the more reach contractors have under a privatized system,
the less capacity government is likely to retain.”
Within the context of privatization, government accountability for public goods and
services delivered through a public-private partnership can be defined as a function of the
degree to which the production and delivery of these goods and services can be specified.
Figure 2.2 summarizes this relationship. As the degree of specificity increases, the
government agency can ensure it maintains its responsibility to the public by holding the
private partner to greater accountability standards.
Figure 2.2. Accountability as an Increasing Function of Project Specificity
Increased
accountability

Increasing degree
of specificity

Source: Developed by the research team.

Partner Selection
The adverse selection problem primarily relates to the issue of selecting the right private
partner for the privatization efforts. Many proponents of privatization argue that
competition among private organizations is the driving force behind successful
privatization. However, privatization efforts undertaken via partnerships usually require
establishing a long-term relationship between the public agency and the outside partner.
Because of the complex nature of most public services, contracts are typically written for
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multiyear periods, thus foreclosing easy competitive access to substitute providers if the
outputs are not up to par or the outcomes are not achieved. As a result of this long-term
relationship and multi-year contract, it is the characteristics of the public-private
relationship that determines the quality of the jointly provided public good or service and
the cost savings resulting from private sector involvement, not the competitive
marketplace (Sclar 2000).
Government agency’s method of selecting private partner(s) typically depends on the
degree of task complexity, professionalization or required technical expertise. As task
complexity increases, or as the need for professional or technical expertise increases,
private partner selection more often needs to be based on negotiation, and the partnership
arises more as a negotiated contract than from competitive bidding or tendering. The
distinction to be made is between partner selection on the basis of the “lowest price” and
selection on the basis of the “best value.”
Competitive bidding or tendering is based on delivering a public good or service for a
fixed price, and the private agency with the lowest bid is selected as the private partner.
This approach to privatization puts the private partner at risk to deliver the public goods
and services within the cost constraints, which according to economic theory will force it
to be more efficient and innovative in producing and delivering the goods and services.
Negotiated contracts, in contrast, involves the government agency identifying a private
agency it feels it can trust and work with, and making this private agency its partner in
delivering public goods and services within the context to be specified in the contract.
Negotiated contracts with these pre-identified partners often involve projects
characterized by long-term partnerships; the need for flexibility; high degree of
uncertainty; costly disruption in service; and information transparency. Table 2.4
highlights the project characteristics that make private partner selection via competitive
bidding or negotiated contracts more appropriate.
Table 2.4. Characteristics of Competitive Bidding and Negotiated Contracts
Project
Characteristics
Project or task
certainty
Output and outcome
measurement
Ease of private partner
replacement
Emphasis on ends vs.
means

Competitive Bidding

Negotiated Contract

□ Preferred when requirements
can be precisely specified in
advance
□ The easier it is to measure
results.
□ The more readily incompetent
private sector partners can be
replaced.
□ The more the government
agency knows about the best
means to accomplish the task.

□ Preferred when the task at
hand is more uncertain at the
outset and prone to revision.
□ The harder it is to measure the
value of production.
□ The more disruptive it is to
switch partners in project midstream.
□ The more the government
agency cares more about ends
over means.

Source: Developed by the research team.
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Chapter 3: Public-Private Partnership Models

3.1 FHWA Public-Private Partnership Models
There is an infinite range of public-private partnership models, or as Lyons and Hamlin
(1991) suggest, “methods for carrying out such partnerships are limited only by the
imagination” (p. 55). In the context of transportation infrastructure and services, the
FHWA defines a range of options for public agencies to involve the private sector. The
seven FHWA partnership models are presented in Figure 3.1. These models are organized
along a spectrum from greater public responsibility to greater private responsibility. At
one end of the spectrum are large-scale infrastructure projects such as the construction of
a railway or tollway in which the private sectors undertakes design, construction,
maintenance and operations (and possibly even ownership) and assumes a greater
proportion of the risks, rewards, and responsibilities. Alternatively, limited private sector
involvement in only parts of the initiative represents the other spectrum of public-private
partnership models.
Figure 3.1. FHWA Public-Private Partnership Models
Greater Private
Responsibility

Greater Public
Responsibility
Design
Bid
Build
(DBB)

Build
Own
Operate
(BOO)

Design Build
Finance
Operate
(DBFO)

FHWA
Public-Private
Partnership
Models
Build Operate
Transfer (BOT)
or Design Build
Operate Maintain
(DBOM)

Private
Contract
Fee Services
(PCFS)

Design
Build
(DB)

Source: Developed by the research team.

The public-private partnership models or arrangements discussed in this chapter highlight
the ways in which private sector responsibilities can be expanded through the use of
partnerships. Partnership options expand across a spectrum of varying degrees of public
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and private responsibilities, and range from the more traditional separation of design and
construction, to transferring tasks normally done-in house to the private sector, to
combining typically separate services into a single procurement or having private sector
partners assume owner-like roles.
The different models are defined in Table 3.1 and their key characteristics are
summarized in Table 3.2. Each partnership model is further explained and discussed in
the following sections. While this is not a comprehensive list of all public-private
partnership models available for transportation infrastructure and services, it
encompasses the models identified by the FHWA as appropriate mechanisms for private
sector participation in the delivery of transportation infrastructure and services. For each
option identified by the FHWA, this report discusses how the partnership is structured,
including the responsibilities of the public and private parties, and identifies the
opportunities and constraints associated with the partnership model.
3.2 Design Bid Build (DBB)
The design bid build model is a public-private partnership approach in which the
government agency contracts with two separate private sector entities. An architectural
or engineering firm receives a design contract for the design of the infrastructure or
facility. This contract is typically awarded based on the contractor’s work quality and
experience. The contractor is usually responsible for providing detailed documentation
of the design such as drawings, specifications, and other supporting documentation upon
design completion. Once the design has been completed, private firms bid for the contract
to construct the project. The public sector entity awards the contract to the lowest bidder,
for a fixed fee, and is responsible for securing eminent domain and right-of-way, as well
as oversight of the project during the construction phase. Once construction is completed,
the government agency is responsible for operating and maintaining the facility.
Ownership and financing of the project resides entirely within the public domain.
The DBB model has recently been utilized for the design and construction of two light
rail tunnels running underneath the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. These
tunnels are an integral portion of the larger Hiawatha Light Rail Transit project in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Public officials decided to use the DBB model for this portion
of the project because of the difficulty associated with tunneling below airport runways
and buildings. For this specific portion of the project, a higher level of expertise than
available in the public sector was necessary, necessitating the need for private sector
involvement through the design bid build approach. Now complete, the Hiawatha Light
Rail Transit links downtown Minneapolis with the Minneapolis-St. Paul International
Airport and the Mall of America. In 2005, the line carried approximately 7.9 million
riders, exceeding pre-construction estimates by 58 percent.
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Table 3.1. Summary of Public-Private Partnership Models for Delivery of Transportation Projects
Partnership
Model
Design-Bid-Build

Private Contract
Fee Services

Design-Build

Build-OperateTransfer (BOT) or
Design- BuildOperate-Maintain
(DBOM)

Design-BuildFinance-Operate
(DBFO)

Build-OwnOperate (BOO)

Definition

Project Examples

Project delivery approach that separates design and construction responsibilities, awarding them to different
private entities (i.e. design to an independent private engineer and construction to a different private
contractor). The delivery process is separated into three linear phases: (1) design; (2) bid; and (3)
construction. The public sector retains responsibility for financing, operating and maintaining the
infrastructure.
This model expands the private sector’s role to functions beyond planning, design or construction, on a fee
for service basis. This is typically done by awarding competitively procured contracts to the bidder
providing the best value. Two types of private contract fee services have typically been used: (1) operations
and maintenance fee service contracts; and (2) program and financial management fee service contracts. Use
of this partnership model has sometimes involved long-term maintenance and/or operations contracts for
infrastructure facilities (asset management contracts).
Project delivery approach that combines two, usually separate functions, into a single contract. The private
sector assumes responsibility for the majority of the design work and all construction activities, together
with the risks associated with providing these services for a fixed fee. The public sector provides financing,
oversight, and operations and maintenance of the project upon completion of the design and construction.
BOT: This model represents an integrated partnership combining design and construction with operations
and maintenance. This involves transfer of design, construction, and operation to a private sector partner,
through a competitive bidding process. The public agency secures financing and retains the operating
revenue risk and surplus operating revenue. A time specific contract is used, where private sector partner
retains ownership until the end of the contract term, at which point ownership returns to the public agency.
DBOM: Similar to the BOT model, DBOM also involves the design, construction, and operation to a private
sector partner, for a specific time period. Again, the private sector partner retains ownership until the end of
the contract term, at which point ownership returns to the public agency.
An extension of BOT/DBOM where the private sector partner is responsible for financing the project and
assuming the risks of project financing during the contract term, in addition to the design and construction
and operations and maintenance. During the length of time specific project, ownership of the project resides
with the private sector, though at the end of the contract, ownership as well as operations and maintenance
revert to the public sector.
BOO is a project delivery method similar to BOT/DBOM, with the private sector partner owning and
operating the facility. A private company is granted the right to develop, finance, design, build, own,
operate, and maintain the project. The private sector partner owns the project outright and retains the
operating revenue risk and all of the surplus operating revenue in perpetuity. The private sector is under no
obligation for the government to purchase or take title to the facility.

Airport tunnels portion of the
Hiawatha Light Rail Transit linking
downtown
Minneapolis
with
Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport and
Mall of America
Maintenance of city streets, tunnels,
pavements,
bridges,
roadside
features,
pedestrian
bridges,
roadside vegetation, guardrails,
barriers, impact attenuators and
signs in Washington, D.C.
New segments of Virginia Route
288 as well as the construction of a
four lane highway from Powhite
Parkway to I-64.
Route 3 in the Northern Boston
Metropolitan area

Source: Developed by the research team.
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California State Road 125, the
South Bay Express Way.

Chicago Regional Environmental
and
Transportation
Efficiency
Project (CREATE), an integrated
project to improve commuter/rail
service, traffic fluidity, rail freight.

Table 3.2. Summary of Characteristics of the Public-Private Partnership Models
Government Agency Responsibilities (a)

Private/Non-Profit Agency Responsibilities
Partnership
Model

Design Bid Build
Private Contract
Fee Services

Design

Construction

X(e)

X(e)

X

X

Operations

Maintenance

Operations

Maintenance

X

X

Supplemental
Infrastructure (b)

(d)

Low

G

G

Low

G

Monitoring

X
X

Design Build
X
X
X
X
X
Low
G
Build Operate
Transfer or
Design Build
Operate Maintain
X
X
X
X
X
Medium
P/G
Design Build
Finance Operate
X
X
X
X
High
P/G
Build Own
Operate
X
X
X
X
X
Low
P
(a) In all models, the government agency is responsible for right-of-way and eminent domain issues.
(b) Includes responsibilities for all connecting infrastructure.
(c) G – government ownership; P – private sector ownership; G/P – private ownership for duration of the partnership contract then reverts to the public sector.
(d) G – government financing; P – private financing; G/P – primarily government with some private financing; P/G – primarily private with some public financing.
(e) These activities are typically undertaken by different private firms.
Source: Developed by the research team.
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Source of
Financing

Infrastructure
Ownership (c)

Fiscal/
Payment

G
G

G/P
P/G
P

Figure 3.2. Design Bid Build Model

Public Sector

Public-Private Partnership
Contractual Relationship
Contractor selection
based on experience
or work quality
Competitive bid
Fixed fee payment
structure

Responsibilities
•
•
•
•
•

Eminent
Domain
Right-of-way
Operations
Maintenance
Finance

Private Sector

Firm A

Firm B

Responsibilities:
•

Design

Responsibilities:
•

Construction

Ownership: Public
Source: Developed by the research team.

3.3 Private Contract Fee Services (PCFS)
Another option available to the public sector is contracting specific transportation
services to the private sector. Essentially, the government agency enters into a contract
with a private partner to either perform operation and/or maintenance services or program
management and/or financial services. Partnership contracts are generally time specific
for a fixed fee, though they can also be incentive based. These contracts are typically
competitively bid and awarded to the lowest bidder. There are two categories of activities
provided through private contract fee services. Public-private contracts for program
management or financial services may involve the private sector providing cash
management assistance, capital funds management, identification of informational needs,
or simply coordinating public sector studies. Public-private contracts for operations or
maintenance may involve major repairs and continual maintenance of the infrastructure
under contract.
One recent example of the private contract fee services model is the management of local
streets of Washington, DC. In June 2000, the District of Columbia Division of
Transportation (DDOT) awarded a contract to VMS, Inc., to preserve and maintain
approximately 75 miles of the major streets and highways in the District. The five-year
contract cost approximately $70 million and included the maintenance of tunnels,
pavements, bridges, roadside features, roadside vegetation, traffic safety equipment, and
snow and ice removal. Rather than providing specific preservation and maintenance
instructions to the private corporation, the contract instead was performance-based, with
the desired outcomes outlined and VMS given the discretion to decide how to achieve
those goals.
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Figure 3.3. Private Contract Fee Services Model
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•
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•
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Ownership: Public
Source: Developed by the research team.

3.4 Design Build (DB)
The design build model is a public-private partnership approach in which the private
partner designs and builds a facility for the government agency, generally within a
specific timeframe for a fixed-fee. In addition to its general role of securing eminent
domain and right-of-way, the public partner will provide oversight, operation and
maintenance once construction is complete, as well as retain ownership of the
infrastructure.
Figure 3.4. Design Build Model
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Design
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Ownership: Public
Source: Developed by the research team.

When the public entity determines that a design build public-private partnership model is
appropriate, the government agency enters into a contract with the private partner. The
private firm will be responsible for both the design and construction of the facility as well
as the risks associated with delivering these activities for a fixed fee. Once the facility is
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complete, the government agency operates and maintains the facility. The financing of
the project lies entirely with the public sector.
Virginia’s Route 288 is one transportation project achieved using the design build model,
which involved the construction of new segments of Route 288 as well as the
construction of a four lane highway from the Powhite Parkway to Interstate 64 in
Goochland County. Route 288 was intended to provide motorists in Goochland,
Chesterfield and Powhatan counties a travel alternative that significantly decreased travel
times throughout the region. The 17.5 mile four-lane highway opened to motorists in
2004. The Virginia Department of Transportation estimated that by contracting with a
private sector partner using the design build model, the state saved an estimated $47
million in costs and 7 months of construction time.

3.5 Build Operate Transfer (BOT)
The FHWA defines the build operate transfer model as a public-private partnership
approach in which the public sector contracts with the private sector for the construction,
operation, and maintenance of a facility or project.1 The government agency is
responsible for the financing and design of the project, in addition to the more traditional
role in securing eminent domain and right-of-way. The private partner has ownership of
the project throughout the length of the contract, with ownership reverting back to the
government at then end of the contract.
Figure 3.5. Build Operate Transfer Model
Public-Private Partnership
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•
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Design

Ownership: Private/Public
Source: Developed by the research team.

1

Other definitions, such as that used by the National Council for Public Private Partnerships (NCPPP),
include private sector financing for BOT projects. The FHWA states that the financing in BOT projects
remains the responsibility of the public sector. This report uses the latter definition since states mostly
follow FHWA guidelines when constructing highway and transportation infrastructure through publicprivate partnerships.
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The BOT partnership contract is time specific. For a specified price and time period, the
private partner will construct, operate and maintain the infrastructure for the government
agency. When the contract ends, the private partner transfers these functions back to the
public sector. According to the FHWA, there have not been any major projects in the
U.S. that have taken the form of BOT partnerships with public financing.

3.6 Design Build Operate Maintain (DBOM)
The design build operate maintain model is a public-private partnership approach in
which the public sector contracts with a private partner that will be responsible for the
design, construction, operation and maintenance of a facility or project for a specified
time period. Though much of the project responsibility is transferred to the private
sector, ultimately the public sector is responsible for the financing of the project as well
as securing eminent domain and right-of-way. Ownership of the project resides with the
private sector during the length of the contract and upon completion, ownership reverts
back to the public sector, as does the other responsibilities assigned to the private sector.
Figure 3.6. Design Build Operate Mountain Model
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Source: Developed by the research team.

One example of a project using the DBOM model is the expansion of Route 3 in the
Northern Boston Metropolitan area. Traffic counts on Route 3 had grown considerably,
far surpassing acceptable capacity rates and approaching the limit for providing a safe
level of operating conditions. The Massachusetts legislature created the Route 3 North
Transportation Improvements Association, a non-profit corporation, to issue bonds to
finance the reconstruction of Route 3. After proceeding through a bidding process, the
Massachusetts Highway Department awarded the contract to Modern Continental, a
private firm. Construction on Route 3 began in 2000 and is expected to be completed
during summer 2006, during which 47 bridges will be replaced and 21 miles of highway
will be reconstructed.
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3.7 Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO)
The design build finance operate model is a public-private partnership approach that
bundles most of the responsibilities for a project, and gives them to the private sector. A
private firm is responsible for the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and
financing of the project, and retains ownership throughout the life of the contract. Upon
completion of the contract, ownership of the project reverts to the public sector. The
government agency is also responsible for securing eminent domain and assuring rightof-way for the project.
Figure 3.7. Design Build Finance Operate Model
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Contractual Relationship
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Source: Developed by the research team.

When the government agency has determined that a DBFO model is appropriate, it then
enters into a concession or contract with the private partner. In general, these contracts
outline the number of years the private partner will operate, maintain, and collect revenue
after the completion of the design and construction of the project. Also typically included
in the contract are non-compete clauses, through which the public sector assures the
private partner that no “competing projects” near the contract project would be
constructed that could potentially take away revenue from the private partner. In the case
of a toll highway or bridge, the government agency is likely to set a toll limit and cap the
amount of profit the private entity can accumulate in a given year. With regards to profit
restrictions, the contract will generally also state the use of excess profits.
The state of California chose to utilize the DBFO model for the construction of SR 125 –
the South Bay Express Way – a toll road in San Miguel, California. Though this stretch
of highway was originally added to the state’s freeway system in 1959, funding issues
prevented the road from being constructed. With the partnership between Caltrans (the
government agency) and California Transportation Ventures (the private partner), the
South Bay Expressway is being constructed many years ahead of schedule. The
Expressway is a privately-financed express toll road connecting SR 54 in Spring Valley
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to SR 905 in Otay Mesa. The 10 mile section of the South Bay Expressway is set to open
in the Fall of 2006.
Local public partners have also been integral to the completion of the project. The San
Diego Association of Government is responsible for funding the interchange that links
the South Bay Expressway to the existing freeway network, while the City of Chula Vista
facilitated a land dedication program required for right-of-way.
3.8 Build Own Operate (BOO)
The build own operate model is a public-private partnership approach in which the
private partner constructs, operates, maintains and retains ownership of the facility. The
public sector forms a partnership with a private firm, and this private partner is
responsible for the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of that facility. The
public sector is responsible for eminent domain and securing right-of-way if necessary.
In some cases, the public sector may also be responsible for the delivery of the
connecting public infrastructure.
Figure 3.8. Build Own Operate Model
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With the BOO model the government agency forms a partnership with a private firm that
will then be responsible for all aspects of the project, including ownership. It is the
ownership aspect of this model that significantly differentiates it from the other publicprivate partnership models, as the private sector retains ownership of the property and
facilities constructed for the purposes of the project. Previously, the BOO model has
been used in large projects that have many goals and various interested parties or in
projects that may only serve a small portion of the population, where it is not feasible for
the public sector to dedicate scarce resources. A BOO model can also potentially be used
for the completion of only one portion of an overall larger project.
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One project using the BOO model is the Chicago Regional Environmental and
Transportation Efficiency Project (CREATE). The CREATE project has brought
together members of the Association of American Railroads, the Chicago Department of
Transportation (CDOT), the State of Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), and
six private railroad companies. The CREATE public-private partnership was formed to
restructure, modernize, and expand freight and passenger rail facilities and highway
grade separations in the Chicago region to account for the estimated increases in the
region’s rail and highway traffic. Expanding rail capacity should remove the growth
pressure on highway infrastructure as both freight and passenger service will be more
reliable and efficient.
The participating private railroads will be responsible for the design, construction, and
implementation of all railroad components; Chicago’s Metropolitan Rail (Metra) will be
responsible for the design, construction, and implementation of all Metra components;
and IDOT or CDOT will be responsible for the design and construction of all public
components. Once the project is completed, each component shall become the property
of the party that owns the property on which the components were constructed or
installed. Each owner is also responsible for continued maintenance, operation, and
management on project components on its property.
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Chapter 4: Public-Private Partnership Decision Factors
State departments of transportation and other government agencies considering
privatizing the delivery of transportation infrastructure or services must make two
important decisions. The first decision is whether or not to privatize transportation
projects through a public-private partnership. If the decision is made to go ahead with
privatization via a public-private partnership, the follow-up decision involves which
partnership approach or model to adopt. This chapter discusses these important decisions
and explains issues and criteria useful for decision-making.

4.1 Deciding to Privatize
When is privatization an appropriate solution for providing public goods and services? In
general, Donahue (1989) argues that the case for privatization is stronger (1) the more
precisely a task can be specified in advance and its performance evaluated after the fact;
(2) the more certainly contractors can be made to compete; (3) the more readily
disappointing contractors can be penalized or replaced; and (4) the more narrowly
government cares about ends to the exclusion of means. Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993)
suggest that privatization is a feasible solution when, all else being equal, the private
sector is for some reason or another inherently more efficient than the public sector.
Cohen (2001) suggests that the decision to privatize can be addressed using a “strategic
framework … developed in the form of a set of questions that should be asked by
government organizations” (p. 437). This framework, to be discussed next, is based on
questions and issues raised by Donahue (1989), Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993),
Milward and Provan (2000), Cohen (2001), and Rosetti (2002). The key questions of this
strategic framework are discussed next and summarized in Table 4.1.
1. What are the goals and constraints of the privatization initiative being considered?
There can be several reasons and goals for privatization. While enhanced efficiency
and cost savings are acceptable motivations for pursuing privatization, experience has
shown that privatization efforts are rarely successful at either. Therefore, greater
efficiency and cost savings may not be sufficient reasons to pursue privatization,
especially in the form of partnerships. On the other hand, collaborative efforts
through public-private partnerships do make it possible to pursue, through
privatization, the goals of improved and/or innovative services.
Traditionally, if the privatization goals and the pursuit of privatization present any
political, social, or cultural constraints, government agencies have shied away from
pursuing privatization initiatives. However, with PPPs, privatization initiatives can be
implemented even in the face of such constraints or conflicts, since this approach to
privatization does not directly remove the government agency from the collaborative
effort.
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2. To what extent must the government agency be involved in the tasks or activities?
An important distinction must be made between ends and means. If the means are as
important as the ends to be achieved, then it is unlikely that privatization will be
appropriate. For example, if the individual parts involved in delivering a
transportation infrastructure are as important as the infrastructure itself, the private
firm will have less flexibility to be creative and innovative in delivering the overall
project. As such, privatization will not provide the opportunities to tap private sector
expertise and will not be a worthwhile pursuit as government dictates of
specifications will limit the actions that can be taken by the private firm. Privatization
through public-private partnerships and the subsequent private delivery of public
infrastructure and services introduces concerns about the loss of accountability and
transparency to the public. This is one reason why privatization is more appropriate
for situations where the government agency is concerned more with ends than with
means.
If the government agency must periodically provide input for program and task
design once delivery has been transferred to the private sector, public-private
partnership serves as an appropriate approach to privatization. Other privatization
approaches would be appropriate if minimal post-transfer government input is
required. If extensive government input is continuously required, privatization should
not be seriously considered as a solution to providing public goods and services.
3. Does the government agency currently have the capacity to perform these tasks?
Government agencies that produce at least some services will be more effective at
governing a privatization initiative. In a monopsony, where the government agency is
the sole buyer of the private partner’s goods and services, producing some of these
goods and services is the only way for the government agency to learn about the costs
of production. “No hidden hand pushes the providers toward efficient outcomes”
(Milward & Provan 2000, p. 376). Producing as well as providing services also
provides information for the government agency to deter the tendency of the few
private firms to produce similar services so as to collude on pricing. If the
government agency has some capacity to perform the tasks and plans to maintain
some of this capacity, the government agency should seriously consider privatization.
4. How measurable are the outputs and outcomes of the proposed privatization
initiative?
If objective and measurable output and outcomes can be easily identified, and data
collection is feasible and simple, privatization is a feasible option. In addition,
verifiability of the data is also a factor in deciding to privatize. The easier it is for the
private partner to lie about the work performed, the outputs produced, and the
outcomes achieved, the less willing the government agency should be to pursue
privatization.
5. How capital intensive is the activity?
The costs and availability of capital is an important decision factor. If the proposed
activity is highly capital intensive, only a select few private firms would be able to do
the work, significantly limiting the candidate pool for private partners. The
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availability of public sources of capital and the need for private capital to realize the
privatization effort also impact the decision to privatize. The adequacy of public
funding for the project will define the success of the privatization effort, and if
sufficient funding cannot be allocated, privatization should not be pursued. If private
capital is sought, then privatization should proceed via a public-private partnership.
Privatization is easier when the activity or service approximately covers its costs,
neither requiring significant government subsidy nor generating significant surplus.
The need for subsidies does not bar privatization, but it does greatly complicate the
effort to privatize by invariably extending the nature and scope of the political
discussion. Large profits or surpluses do not necessarily prevent privatization, but
they make the privatization issue more controversial with those paying users and
arousing suspicions or fears of monopoly abuse.
6. What is the impact if the task or activity is performed poorly?
If the impact of poorly-performed tasks are irreversible or are reversible at a high
cost, then the government agency should not consider them candidates for
privatization. The potential political, social, and economic impacts of delivery failure
should also be seriously considered. The importance of the task or activity also
dictates whether or not it should be privatized. Critical or urgent services should not
be left to the private sector for delivery of provision. If the tasks and activities to be
privatized are critical to the government agency’s organizational mission,
privatization is less desirable because it poses the risk of possible disruption in the
critical services.
Table 4.1. Strategic Framework for the Privatization Decision
Key Question
1. What are the goals and
constraints of the privatization
initiative being considered?
2. To what extent must the
government agency be involved
in the tasks or activities?
3. Does the government have the
capacity to perform tasks?
4. How measurable are the outputs
and outcomes?
5. How capital intensive is the
activity?

6. What is the impact if the task or
activity is performed poorly?

Impact on Decision to Privatize
□ Privatization may be appropriate if the goal is improved and/or
innovative services.
□ Political, social or cultural constraints complicate but do not
preclude privatization.
□ Privatization should be considered if ends matter to the
exclusion of means.
□ Privatization is less viable if extensive government input is
continuously required.
□ Having the government capacity to produce some of the
services makes privatization a more viable solution.
□ Privatization should be considered if objective and measurable
output and outcomes can be identified and collected.
□ As the costs and up-front capital needs are high, privatization
becomes less feasible.
□ If the government agency seeks private financing,
privatization via a partnership may be a good solution.
□ Privatization is easier when the activity or service
approximately covers its costs.
□ Privatization should not be considered if there are serious
environmental, political, social or economic impacts of service
failure or if the impact of poor performance is irreversible or
reversible at high cost.

Source: Developed by the research team.
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4.2 Deciding on the Public-Private Partnership Approach
Once the decision has been made to pursue privatization via a partnership, the
government agency then faces the difficult problem of deciding on which partnership
approach to adopt. As Chapter 3 has illustrated, several partnership models exist with
varying degrees of complexity, private sector selection and participation, project
specificity, and project financing. Chapter 3 also highlights the fact that no single model
fits all situations. For example, competition is highly desirable if privatization is to
succeed in some instances. Competition is especially important in encouraging cost
savings or efficiencies that sometimes motivate the privatization. Partnership models that
involve private partner selection through competitive methods, therefore, would be highly
appropriate. However, in many other situations, competition can create serious problems
(as discussed by Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) in their review of the privatization of
highway infrastructure). In these instances, models such as design build or private
contract fee services that are based on competitive tendering may be less appropriate than
other models such as design build operate maintain or build own operate which are based
instead on negotiated contracts with a specific private partner.
The decision on which public-private partnership model to adopt should be made based
on several criteria, including:
The source of financing required
The complexity of the tasks involved
The degree of project specificity
The basis for private partner selection.
These decision criteria and the appropriate public-private partnership models given these
criteria are summarized in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2. Summary of Decision Factors and Appropriate Public-Private Partnership Models
Project Specificity
Source of
Task
Partnership Model
Financing (a) Complexity
Inputs
Outputs
Outcomes

(a)

Design Bid Build

G

Private Contract Fee Services
Design Build
Build Operate Transfer or
Design Build Operate Maintain
Design Build Finance Operate
Build Own Operate

G
G

High

Easily
identified &
measured

Private
Partner
Selection

Simple &
quantitative

Competitive
Tendering

Complex &
quantitative

Negotiated
Contract

G/P
P/G
P

Increasing
Complexity

G – purely government financing;
P – purely private financing;
G/P – primarily government financing with some private financing;
P/G – primarily private financing with some public financing.

Source: Developed by the research team.
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Low

Chapter 5: Key Issues and Critical Success Factors
Public-private partnership initiatives involve a range of skills, experience and resources
to deliver the required infrastructure or service. Milward (1994) noted the irony of
privatization – it is promoted as the solution to government inefficiency and
mismanagement, but it can only work well if the government agency manages the process
well. In child welfare services, for example, to the extent that privatization was
successful, it generally applied only to those situations where the government agency
developed strong management, monitoring, and quality assurance capabilities and
appropriately structured the privatization initiative (Freundlich & Gerstenzang 2003).
Sclar (2000) uses the Massachusetts highway maintenance privatization experience to
illustrate the importance of effective structuring and management of the privatization
effort. In the early 1990s, Massachusetts’ Governor Weld assembled a task force to
consider privatization of different public goods and services. The task force concluded
that highway maintenance was not a good candidate for privatization, because “road
conditions among the state’s maintenance districts vary widely and no reliable historic
information existed about comparative performance standards for either the potential
contractors or the highway department’s own personnel … departmental personnel take
considerable pride in their work, whereas private contractors are bound only by the terms
of their contracts, possibly making their performance inconsistent and difficult to verify”
(Sclar 2000, p. 30).
Privatization efforts, however, proceeded despite the task force’s warnings, and highway
maintenance privatization began in 1992, with a pilot experiment in Essex County,
Massachusetts. This privatization effort involved a single contractor responsible for
highway maintenance tasks, including the cleaning, repair, and maintenance of highways,
bridges, signage, traffic control, and lighting systems; roadside mowing and tree
trimming; and the operation of drawbridges. The contractual language of the request for
proposal specified in detail the repair methods, material specifications, quality standards,
and safety precautions; stipulated limitations on the value of subcontracts; included
provisions for minority employees and subcontractors; and defined minimum training
requirements for drawbridge operators.
However, the many detailed specifications in this contract were insufficient. The breadth
and scope of the contract also significantly limited the pool of private contractors. The
contract, won by the Middlesex Corporation, went into effect in October 1992. In May
1994, the House Post Audit and Oversight Bureau released an interim report on the first
year of the Essex County privatization effort. The report identified problems in the areas
of contract management and the determination of comparative costs. The contract
management problems fell into three general categories: oversight, delegation, and actual
performance. The terms of the contract made the nature of oversight vague. The contract
allowed Middlesex Corporation to set its own internal working priorities (without much
government oversight), and then be judged and receive payments based on the ultimate
output and outcomes. Privatization efforts were also marked by a reduction in
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maintenance activities and subsequent costs – which were in the private contractor’s
realm of responsibility – with the costs being shifted toward capital costs to be paid for
by the public agency at a later date.
In addition, the state had the right to order less work than described in the contract, thus
having the ability to keep the final cost below the original price. The House Post Audit
and Oversight Bureau report concluded that any reduction in the actual contract cost (due
to reduced maintenance work) represented expense deferrals, not cost savings. A
subsequent study by the State Auditor found that instead of delivering cost savings, the
Essex County privatization experiment actually cost the state an additional $1.1 million
than what would have been spent by performing maintenance activities in-house. Sclar
(2000) concluded that the primary problems with the Massachusetts highway
maintenance privatization effort resulted from the lack of ground rules delineating the
nature of the service set forth before the privatization and the lack of government
oversight.

5.1 Challenges for Successful Privatization through Public-Private Partnerships
Privatization of the provision of public goods and services, even through a public-private
partnership, requires a shift in the roles of the government agency. Rather than being the
independent and only provider of the public goods and services, government agencies
become partners who must be smart and prudent in their dealings with the private partner
that ultimately provides the goods and services. As noted earlier, government agencies
must adopt what Fossett et al. (2000) refer to as “prudent purchasing” or what Kettle
(1993) calls “smart buying.”
Gormley (1994) argues that privatization efforts will only be successful if the government
agencies bring four key skills to the privatization effort. These include the ability to (1)
match partners (private firms or non-profit agencies) with the appropriate privatization
program; (2) combine the public and private sectors in creative ways; (3) monitor to
“avoid unfettered discretion;” and (4) evaluate to “ensure that [privatization] programs
actually provide the desired results” (p. 231). Similarly, Sclar (2000) suggests that three
important factors typically contribute to the successful outcomes of privatization. These
are: (1) the process used to choose the private partner; (2) the technological constraints of
the work; and (3) the relationship between the government agency and the private
partner. Fossett et al. (2000) require that government agencies (1) specify performance
requirements in measurable form; (2) acquire the ability to determine if and how private
contractors are complying with the performance requirements; and (3) hold private firms
accountable for meeting requirements and sanction them for failure to comply with the
standards and requirements.
The literature suggests that a clear and strong relationship between the government and
private agencies involved in the privatization effort is the cornerstone of success. This is
even more true with regards to privatization through public-private partnerships, as the
relationship between the two is that of partners, and not a clearly-defined principal-agent
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relationship. This report concludes with key issues and critical success factors for the
effective and successful privatization through public-private partnerships. These issues
and success factors are based on theoretical and empirical research, and draw on findings
from recent experiences with privatization and public-private partnerships both in the
U.S. and in the international arena. In-depth review of these issues and factors can be
found in Freundlich and Gerstenzang (2003), Frisch (2002); Goldsmith and Eggers
(2004), Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993), Grimsey and Lewis (2004), Klijn and Teisman
(2000), Osborne and Murray (2000), Romzek and Johnston (2005), Rossetti (2002) and
Sclar (2000).
The key issues and critical success factors are organized into three categories:
1. Process factors – factors that must be addressed and considered before structuring a
partnership.
2. Partner factors – relevant factors for selecting the right partner(s) and structuring the
relationship with these partner(s).
3. Structural factors – factors related to how the partnership is structured, put together
and managed.
These issues and factors are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Summary of Key Issues and Critical Success Factors for Partnerships
Process Factors
Partner Factors
Structural Factors
□ Provide economic
□ Carefully design and
□ Clearly delineate roles
rationale for private
consistently implement
and responsibilities
sector involvement.
the partner selection
□ Adopt performance□ Create institutional
process.
based contracting.
support and
□ Develop the necessary
□ Enforce effective
organizational
relationships to pursue
contract accountability.
infrastructure for
the agreed-on common
collaborative efforts.
goal.
Source: Developed by the research team.

5.2 Process Factors
Process factors are those issues and factors that, when considered and addressed before
structuring the partnership, build the strong foundation for successful privatization
through a public-private partnership. The relevant foundational issues are: (1) provide
economic rationale for private sector involvement; and (2) create institutional support and
infrastructure for privatization through collaborative efforts.

Economic Rationale for Private Sector Involvement
Before a successful partnership can be structured, the government agency must first
produce an economic rationale for why the private sector should be involved in the
delivery of the public goods and services. This economic rationale should identify goals
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of privatization, document the need for private sector involvement, and demonstrate the
business case to entice the private sector to participate.
In terms of goals, the government agency must determine what it wants to achieve
through privatization. For example, privatization goals may be cost savings, cost control,
enhanced service delivery, private sector expertise, or access to private capital. When
defining goals, the government agency should clearly specify (Freundlich & Gerstenzang
2003): (1) the population to be served by the partnership; (2) the partnership approach;
(3) roles and responsibilities of the government agency and private firm(s); and (4)
funding and payment mechanisms. Documenting the need for private sector involvement
requires identifying what it is that the private sector contributes to the delivery of the
public goods and services. In addition, the private sector must be able to profit from
participating in the partnership. The government agency must highlight these profit
opportunities by presenting the business case for the private sector

Institutional Support and Organizational Infrastructure
Creating institutional support and organizational infrastructure is also essential for
successful collaboration during the partnership. Strong institutional support comes from
having high-level, continuous leadership, achieving broad buy-in and having long-term
organizational commitment to the privatization initiative and the collaborative efforts
needed to achieve privatization goals. It is critical that key actors both within and outside
the organization not only buy-in to the initiative, but also participate in getting the publicprivate partnership launched. Personal commitment and leadership are also vital for
ensuring that collaborative efforts are developed and sustained. A strong infrastructure, in
turn, is characterized by a shared vision of the initiative, adequate management and
staffing, and adequate financial support for the initiative.

5.3 Partner Factors
Partner factors include two types of relevant issues: (1) issues pertaining to selecting the
right partner(s); and (2) issues important for structuring the relationship with these
partner(s).

Private Partner Selection
Pack (1991) argues that contracting out as a privatization approach will be most effective
when meaningful competition is secured in the bidding process, especially through a
competitive tendering process. For privatization through PPPs, however, meaningful
competition is not as crucial. Grimsey and Lewis (2004) argue for rigorous and robust
competitive tendering process as part of the establishment of successful partnerships.
However, “experience has shown that establishing a competitive process does not
necessarily result in real competition” (Freundlich & Gerstenzang 2003, p. 277). In fact,
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it is not uncommon for competitively bid contracts to elicit responses from only one
bidder (Schlesinger et al. 1986). For public-private partnerships, especially, competitive
tendering may not be the most effective method for partner selection. Many of the more
successful partnerships result from relationships with pre-existing or pre-identified
partners, resulting in negotiated contracts. Bringing these partners to the table early has
often resulted in a strong partnership capable of delivering on the promised goals.
The most important factor in selecting a private partner is that the selection process be
carefully designed and consistently implemented. The process should clearly
communicate the nature and scope of the program, the fiscal (funding or payment)
methodology, and the requirements of the private agency in terms of service provision
and accountability. The process – from seeking bids to finalizing the contract – should be
implemented in a consistent, predictable manner and be designed to bear up under public
scrutiny.

Partnering Relationship
The key requirement for successful partnership is that the government agency be
prepared to relinquish some control and authority to the private partner. In developing a
working relationship, the government agency should build on existing relationships
whenever possible or allow more time to develop the necessary relationships before
launching into the actual negotiations and the initial stages of collaborations. Successful
relationship building requires agreement among partners on important common goals,
with the acknowledgement that each partner may also have secondary goals that can be
pursued if they do not interfere with the mutual goals. In addition to agreement on the
relevant end goals, partners must also agree on the beneficiaries and/or customers of their
collaborative efforts.
The long-term nature of many public-private partnerships also makes it necessary that
both the government and private partners exhibit long-term commitment to the
privatization effort. Flexibility is a crucial aspect of the partnership and must be
maintained throughout the relationship. Both partners must accept that competitive
tensions will continue to be a legitimate part of the partnership’s collaborative efforts,
which will need to be recognized and managed. A strong relationship also requires that a
process be set-up early in the life of the partnership to identify and reconcile the
diverging views, goals, and approaches of the multiple partners.

5.4 Structural Factors
The prevailing assumption behind the privatization of public goods and services delivery
is that it ensures effective contractor performance, greater clarity and transparency
regarding performance responsibilities, and easy recourse when contractor performance
fails to meet expectations (Light 2000; Sclar 2000). However, studies of state
privatization of social services have suggested that government agencies have found it
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difficult to hold contractors accountable for their performance (Fossett et al. 2000;
Romzek & Johnston 2002). Incorporating the necessary structural factors into the
implementation of the public-private partnership is an important way to ensure
performance and accountability of the private partner(s). The key structural factors that
must be considered or addressed include: (1) clearly delineate roles and responsibilities;
(2) adopt performance-based contracting; and (3) enforce effective contract
accountability.

Roles and Responsibilities
The successful partnership hinges on a contract that is written in language that is
understandable to all partners. Contracts should specifically state the services to be
provided, to whom they are provided, and the results to be obtained. The obligations of
both government and private partners and their respective roles and responsibilities
should be clearly defined, especially with respect to key structural roles. It is not
sufficient to only detail the private firm’s roles and responsibilities in relation to service
delivery and accountability. The government agency’s obligations – such as timely
payment, responsiveness to provider’s questions, and monitoring of outcomes – should
also be specified.
This detailed delineation of roles and responsibilities supports greater efficiency for the
collaborative efforts and provides a framework for implementing and assessing the effect
of the partnership’s activities. However, most privatization contracts and arrangements do
not explicitly define the division of roles and responsibilities. For example, only two of
the contracts related to the privatization of child welfare services (as reviewed by
Freundlich & Gerstenzang (2003)) contained clear language regarding the role and
obligations of the public agencies. Michigan’s contract had a paragraph titled “Family
Independence Agency [FIA] Responsibilities, which, while specifying the government
agency’s roles and responsibilities, made no mention of its obligations to make timely
payment to the private agencies or provide technical assistance in response to their needs.
Risk allocation must also be clearly specified. Risk shifting has become an increasingly
common component of privatization contracts. In the risk-shifting scenario, the contractor
is expected to bear some of the burden of identifying strategies that can reduce service
costs (Sclar 2000), thus creating an incentive for administrative efficiency. As such,
many proponents of privatization have approached it as an opportunity for the
government agency “to export its uncertainties” (Milward 1994, p. 75). However,
“[when] government sheds risk, the contractor may face incentives to “game” the system
and subvert accountability” (Romzek & Johnston 2005, p. 439). Therefore, for risk
shifting to be successful, the allocation of risk must be explained in the contract and the
private partner must be compensated through a system that is adequate and timely.
Having an exit strategy is also important to ensure that the dissolution of the partnership
is well-managed. The government agency, with input from the private partner, should
develop plans for the disposition of assets, phase-out of service delivery or production,
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and technical and technology transfer. These plans should clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of each party in the dissolution stage of the partnership.

Performance-Based Contracting
Milward and Provan (2000) argue that “[w]hen a reasonable level of funding is combined
with an institutional design that creates incentives for agents to perform as promised, all
other things being equal, reasonable outcomes are likely to result” (p. 368). The
contractual relationship between the government agency and private firms, therefore,
should make it possible for the government to enforce standards for level and quality of
infrastructure or service for which the private partner can be held accountable and
sanctioned if the standards are not met. The process of developing and applying such
standards is known as “prudent” or “value” purchasing (Fossett et al. 2000), and
performance-based contracting is the best mechanism through which to achieve it.
“[T]the prudent purchaser must define quality, measure it, seek to improve it, and exert
market leadership… put into place the elements of a good quality management system –
negotiated performance goals, member satisfaction surveys and focus groups,
independent external reviews, continuous quality improvement systems, data reporting,
and consequences for underachievers … use these elements effectively, keeping in mind
that the system should not be micro-managed, or made to respond to unrealistic
expectations” (Bullen 1998).
In addition, states have a wide variety of contractual sanctions available to them,
including, for example, requirements for corrective action plans, freezing payments, or
actual contract termination. However, the government agencies “have been reluctant,
frequently for sound political or market reasons, to use these sanctions, preferring to rely
on more informal solutions” (Fossett et al. 2000, p. 45).
At the early stage of the privatization initiative, the government agency should use a few
selected outputs and outcomes and their associated performance targets. These outputs
and outcomes should represent clearly-defined concepts that are measurable in
straightforward and simple terms. Both the government agency and the private firm
should agree that these selected performance measures and deliverables are appropriate
given the nature of the privatization effort and its goals. They should be based on preprivatization data or on baseline data developed during the initial implementation stage,
as opposed to being arbitrarily defined with no demonstrable relationship to actual
performance. In the early phases of the performance contract, fiscal incentives should be
tied to this limited number of key outputs and outcomes.
Most importantly, performance measures and deliverables must provide the government
agency with the information it needs to determine whether and how well the private
partner is performing. Accurate and timely performance data must be collected. Without
good performance information, the government agency is simply unable to adequately
assess contractor performance or make sound decisions about the allocation of resources
to maximize effectiveness and achieve privatization goals. In addition, performance46

based contracting gives the government agency the right to exclude agencies that cannot
produce acceptable quality services at the agreed upon price and also to exclude private
partners that will not cooperate with the principal (Milward & Provan 2000). This ability
to exclude partners decreases the needed level of government monitoring, as the threat of
sanctions should serve to keep agencies in reasonable compliance with their contracts.
However, case studies of previous privatization initiatives have shown that most have
struggled to measure outcomes and benchmarks that allow for the eventual assessment of
actual performance. While outcomes associated with the privatization effort should be
clearly defined, in most cases, they are not developed with the necessary specificity.
Specific problems with outcomes and benchmarks include: (1) over-reliance on poorly
defined “subjective” outcomes; (2) too many outcomes than could possibly be monitored
or measured; (3) attenuated outcomes beyond the scope of the program; and (4) a large
degree of variability in the outcomes used to assess performance. Even when outcomes
are well-developed to incorporate clearly defined concepts, there can be difficulties
connecting these outcomes to performance targets. These difficulties include: (1) failure
to specify any performance targets or baselines; and (2) performance targets that lack
validation with program data. If no baselines exist, the performance-based contract
should specify that a baseline be established as the public-private partnership is
developed and the private firm gains experience and information about the delivery of the
public goods and services.
The key elements of performance-based contracting are summarized in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2. Key Elements of Performance Contracts
□ Clearly-defined and measurable outputs and outcomes.
□ Manageable number of key outputs and outcomes.
□ Baseline measures or performance targets for outputs and outcomes.
□ Sanctions for non-performance, and subsequent use of sanctions for non-performing
private partners.
□ Fiscal incentives tied to key outputs and outcomes.
□ Provisions for accurate and timely performance data collection and reporting.
Source: Developed by the research team.

Effective Contract Accountability
Effective contracts can be defined as contracts that allow for monitoring to play a
meaningful role. These contracts include clearly defined expectations regarding the
services to be provided, the persons to whom they will be provided, and with what results
(Gormley 1994). In contrast, ineffective contracts (1) contain vague service obligations;
(2) poorly define outcomes and performance measures; (3) poorly specify roles and
responsibilities; and (4) fail to clearly articulate the interventions to be provided. An
evaluation of the privatization experiences in child welfare services found that “the
dynamic in many of the programs was one of inexperienced purchasing agents (public
agencies) attempting to develop at risk contracts with inexperienced sellers” (Freundlich
& Gerstenzang 2003, p. 280).
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“Effective contract accountability refers to a situation in which the state is able to design,
implement, manage, and achieve accountability for its … contract” (Romzek & Johnston
2005, p. 437). For effective contract accountability, an effective contract must be
accompanied by monitoring mechanisms, including an adequate and suitable information
system to produce key data for evaluation of progress in achieving privatization goals.
Having strong monitoring capabilities allows the government agency to ensure effective
government oversight, and assure contract compliance with standards of quality service
provision and achievement of program outputs and outcomes.
The role of monitoring is critical but complex. Milward (1994) captures the complexities
associated with monitoring: “Privatization occurs because severe capacity limitations
force government to contract services it does not have the ability to provide … How can
government be expected to effectively fulfill these functions when limited capacities led
to privatization in the first place?” (p. 79). However, the design of privatization policies,
the implementation of privatization initiatives, and evaluation, typically remain within
government control. Vigilance and follow-up are essential in contracting out, but
“accountability continues to be the Achilles heel of many contracts” (Gormley 1994, p.
224). The responsibility for monitoring and oversight requires that the government
retain the legal authority to effectively provide oversight – that it have the capacity
in terms of expertise, staff, and funding to oversee private sector performance, and
once evaluative criteria have been defined, that it determine private agency
compliance with contractual requirements (General Accounting Office 1998).
However, monitoring can become so extensive as to present serious programmatic issues
and introduce significant monitoring costs. “Ownership” of the monitoring system by one
partner may also pose major problems and introduce conflict into the partnership
structure.
Effective monitoring involves the design of appropriate evaluation tools, including data
collection and analysis. It requires the institutionalization of an information management
system that produce data on costs, service levels, outputs, and outcomes, to create a
critical reservoir of data and information that can be used to determine goal attainment,
cost comparisons and other useful monitoring and feedback purposes. Experiences of
privatization initiatives in child welfare services make clear that data are critical to
determine the cost of services, calculate the cost benefits of the new approaches to
service delivery, establish outcomes and performance standards, and assess the extent to
which outcomes have been achieved. A study by the GAO (1998) found that the
development of management information systems was the most difficult task faced by
program officials as they implemented privatization initiatives.
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion
The goal of this report was to provide a primer on how public-private partnerships could
be used to deliver transportation infrastructure and services. Given the increasing
pressure to privatize the production and delivery of public goods and services, coupled
with the growing popularity of partnership approaches, this report provided policymakers
and government agencies, especially those in the transportation arena, with useful
information and guidelines pertaining to:
Understanding the reasoning behind the use of public-private partnerships;
Differentiating partnerships from contracting out as a privatization approach;
Delineating government agency and private firm roles in the different partnership
models;
Decision factors for public-private partnership adoption; and
Implementing and managing successful partnerships.
In this study we defined public-private partnership as being a broad privatization
approach that included contracting out (see section 2.2). This privatization approach calls
for joint production and joint decision-making by multiple actors in both the public and
private sectors. The FHWA defines seven partnership models for the privatization of the
delivery of transportation infrastructure and services. These models can be organized
along a continuum from greater public responsibility to greater private responsibility, and
can be further differentiated along other dimensions, such as private and government
responsibilities, ownership of the infrastructure, source of financing, contract type or
specification, private partner selection process, and project specificity (see summary
tables – Table 3.1, Table 3.2, and Table 4.2).
The decision to privatize via a public-private partnership, and subsequently the decision
on which partnership model to adopt, were also addressed in this report. A strategic
framework for the first decision was developed as a set of six key questions (summarized
in Table 4.1) and four criteria were presented for the second decision. The decision
criteria for partnership model selection were:
The source of financing required;
The complexity of the tasks involved;
The degree of project specificity; and
The basis for private partner selection.
Once the decision has been made both to privatize and to use public-private partnership,
the government agency is left with the difficult task of successfully implementing and
managing the partnership. In this study we borrowed from theoretical and empirical
research on privatization and public-private partnerships to arrive at three sets of issues
and critical success factors. These issues and factors, summarized in Table 5.1, are:
Process factors that must be addressed before structuring the partnership. This
involves providing an economic rationale for private sector involvement; and
creating institutional support and organizational infrastructure for collaborative
efforts.
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Partner factors relevant to the selection of the right partner(s) and the relationships
with the partner(s). This involves carefully designing and consistently implementing
the partner selection process; and developing the necessary relationships to pursue
the common goal.
Structural factors that are related to how the partnership is structured, put together,
and managed. This involves clearly delineating roles and responsibilities; adopting
performance-based contracting; and enforcing effective contract accountability.
As discussed in this report, public-private partnership has much potential as a tool for
privatizing the delivery of transportation infrastructure and services. However, few
transportation agencies have pursued partnerships, both because of the complexities
involved and the lack of understanding of the partnership concept and the process
involved in using partnerships. This report broadens our understanding of public-private
partnerships and provides basic guidelines for those transportation agencies interested in
harnessing the potential of such partnerships.
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms
Asset Sale: The transfer of ownership of government assets to the private sector.
Concession: The principal agreement between the Public Partner and the private Partner
governing the Project. This agreement may be referred to as the 'Contract' or 'Concession
Agreement'.
Concession benefits: Rights to receive revenues or other benefits from a project for a
fixed period of time.
Franchising: The government grants a concession or privilege to a private sector entity
to conduct business in a particular market or geographical area. The government may
regulate the service level or price, but users of the service pay the provider directly.
Ground Lease: A lease for the use and occupancy of land only, generally for an
extended period of time.
Lease: Written agreement between a property owner and a tenant that stipulates the
conditions under which the tenant may possess the real estate for a specified period of
time and amount of rent.
Lease/Purchase: A lease/purchase is an installment purchase contract where the private
sector finances and builds a new facility, which it then leases back to a public agency.
The public agency makes scheduled lease payments to the private party, where the public
agency accrues equity in the facility with each payment. At the end of the lease term, the
public agency owns the facility or purchases it at the cost of any remaining unpaid
balance in the lease.
Partnership: A legal relationship between two entities contractually associated as joint
principles in business.
Public Purpose Debt: debt used to finance a project intended to be of value to the
general public. Such debt can include ordinary government securities, such as general
obligation or revenue bonds, as well as qualified private activity bonds.
Request for Proposals (RFP): An announcement by a government agency that
demonstrates a willingness to consider proposals for the performance of a specified
project or program component.
Request for Qualifications: A procurement tool used by both the public and private
sector to select partners in major systems acquisitions. This approach places greater
emphasis on the actual qualifications of the potential contractor, rather than how well the
potential contractor responds to the detailed project specifications and requirements.
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Special Experiment Project No. 15 (SEP-15): a new experimental process within the
FHWA to identify, for trial evaluation, new public-private partnership approaches to
project delivery.
Sublease: An arrangement where the lessee leases the property to a different end user
while the lessor maintains ownership.
Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA): Program that
provides federal credit assistance to large-scale projects of regional or national
significance. There are three forms of credit assistance available (1) secured loans, (2)
loan guarantees, and (3) standby lines of credit. The goal of the TIFIA credit program is
to leverage Federal funds by attracting substantial private and other non-federal coinvestment in critical improvements to the nation’s surface transportation system. In
general, both public and private entities seeking to finance, design, construct, own or
operate an eligible surface transport project are eligible for assistance.
Toll Credits: States may apply toll revenues used for capital expenditures on highways
to earn toll credits, which can be used to satisfy the State’s matching requirement for
receipt of Federal-aid highway funding.
Turnkey: A generic term for when a public agency contracts with a private
investor/vendor to design and build a complete facility in accordance with specified
performance standards and criteria agreed to between the agency and the vendor. The
private developer commits to build the facility for a fixed price and absorbs the
construction risk of meeting that price commitment. The financing and ownership of the
facility can rest with either the public or private partner.
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